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The Sanctity of Life Seduced 
A Symposium on Medical Ethics 
Daniel Callahan 
Two important social forces lie behind the poten-tially disastrous turn of public opinion toward 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in recent 
years. The necessary condition is the excessive em-
phasis in our culture on choice and self-determina-
tion. The sufficient condition, the triggering cause, 
has been the highly visible string of court cases from 
Quinlan in 1976 to Cruzan in 1990. 
Those cases shared one important, eye-catching 
feature: someone in the throes of a critical illness was 
not being allowed to die, and it was necessary to turn 
to the courts to make death from natural causes pos-
sible. The American public took from these cases a 
threatening message: if you enter an American hos-
pital or nursing home permanently unconscious, 
you are in danger of having your life extended 
beyond any point most people would care to endure. 
Moreover, the public has now been tutored to under-
stand that medicine has become devilishly clever in 
its ability to keep your body going long after there is 
much, or any, likelihood that you retain any charac-
teristically human capacities or potentialities. 
The only way there will be any chance at all of 
keeping the evil of euthanasia at bay will be to recog-
nize the moral and medical distortions that our obei-
sance to medical technology have insinuated into 
how we commonly think about death and dying. 
Unless people can be convinced that the medical be-
hemoth will not extend their life beyond some rea-
sonable point, they will not be much swayed by slip-
pery-slope arguments. For them the clear and pres-
ent danger is a technologically induced bad death for 
themselves or their family members, not the more 
remote hazard of involuntary euthanasia. 
A particularly frightful feature of the current drive 
for euthanasia is the extent to which it is a genuine 
grass roots movement. The Kevorkians and Hum-
phrys and Quills have given the movement some 
added impetus, but they have not created it. This 
drive existed well before they came along, with a 
strong shift in public opinion visible by the late 1970s, 
at which point a majority of people reported having 
a favorable attitude toward euthanasia. I am endlessly 
struck by the number of ordinary people, not caught 
up in the public debate, who fear a technological 
death and are as a consequence attracted to euthana-
sia or assisted suicide. The well-publicized court 
cases, I am convinced, have steadily inspired the wor-
ries about a bad death now being capitalized upon by 
the promoters of euthanasia. 
How has medical technology—and, more impor-tant, its implicit ideology—led us astray? Its se-
duction has taken three forms. The first is that it has 
led us increasingly to think of death itself as acciden-
tal, a contingent event, no longer the result of natural 
forces but of some human decision. Nature is being 
increasingly banished as a cause of death. For the 
medical researcher, no known cause of death is ac-
ceptable, and the research enterprise carries on an 
endless war against all of them. As Leon R. Kass re-
minded us some years ago, the logic of this kind of 
warfare is nothing less than a search for immortality. 
For the doctor at the bedside, matters are not too 
much different: with a litde more skill, a litde more 
luck, a research breakthrough here or there, this 
dying patient before me might be saved. Although 
they know the feeling is often irrational, many doc-
tors have accepted the imperious myth of modern 
medicine that somehow or other death has become 
their fault—even when they turn off a machine in the 
face of an inevitable, imminent, and unavoidable pa-
tient's demise. They think nature has been banished, 
that only their power over life and death now counts. 
The second seduction of medical technology fol-
lows hard on the heels of the first. It is the incentive 
this technology provides for the erasure of the dis-
tinction between omission and commission, between 
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killing and allowing to die. Many philosophers and 
others, in their search for arguments to legitimate 
euthanasia, have contended that since people become 
dead in either case, there is no serious moral distinc-
tion to be made between turning off a respirator or 
pulling a feeding tube on the one hand, and giving 
someone a lethal injection on the other. Ironically 
and unhappily, many conservative thinkers—out of 
an apparent fear of abuse of the notion of "allowing 
to die"—have themselves come to act as if they also 
see no real moral difference between omission and 
commission either (even if they may still agree with 
the distinction in principle). It is this "as if" attitude 
that has inspired most of the court cases; e.g., if 
Nancy Cruzan is not kept alive with feeding tubes, 
this is tantamount to killing her, not just allowing 
nature to take its course 
The technological seduction behind all this is that 
medicine has now become omnipotent, holding life 
and death wholly in its hands. And we human beings, 
who wield this technology, have now become omni-
responsible. Whether we omit treatment or kill 
people directly is irrelevant. What matters is that, 
whatever we do, death has now become our responsi-
bility and can no longer be blamed on nature. 
The third seduction is the way the ideology of med-
ical progress and technology has managed to capture 
the principle of the sanctity of life and turn that prin-
ciple to its own advantage. As one of the great con-
temporary apostles of medical progress, the lay lob-
byist Mary Lasker, once revealingly put it, "I'm 
really opposed to heart attacks and cancer and 
strokes the way I'm opposed to sin." Death by disease 
has, in an age that cannot accept human finitude or 
mortality, become the equivalent to death by mali-
cious human intent. Correspondingly, many of those 
who would uphold the sanctity of life seem now to 
believe that they must follow technology wherever it 
goes so long as it preserves life. Medical technology, 
the child of the Enlightenment, has coopted the an-
cient principle of the sanctity of life and turned it 
into its handmaiden. 
Is there any way to overcome this captivity to tech-. nology, to allow death to return to its natural 
place, the destiny of us all? I want to urge two princi-
ples that could help us toward that end. The first 
principle is that no one should have to die a worse 
death as a result of medical technology than would 
have been the case prior to the invention of that tech-
nology. If technology threatens to leave us worse off, 
and we nonetheless feel obliged to use it, we have then 
indeed become its slaves. The second principle is that 
doctors should feel as great an anxiety that a patient 
will die a poor death from technological excess as the 
present anxiety that the patient will die because there 
is too little technology; and these dual anxieties 
should remain in tension with each other, neither 
the one nor the other being allowed to gain the upper 
hand. The moral bias now is so powerfully in the di-
rection of using technology to preserve life that pa-
tients are put at risk of a poor death as a result. That 
bias needs changing. 
If used properly, the traditional moral distinction 
between ordinary and extraordinary treatment can 
be most helpful in avoiding the technological seduc-
tions I have mentioned. I take that distinction to 
mean, in its traditional sense, that no one is obliged 
to undergo treatment that imposes too heavy a 
burden if there is no significant and corresponding 
benefit. A more conservative, nontraditional, sense 
has, however, recently become popular in some cir-
cles. It is that benefit to the patient consists of any 
non-burdensome treatment that will sustain life, 
whatever the condition of that life, even the zombie-
like life of the victim in a permanent vegetative state 
(PVS). Moreover, if a non-burdensome antibiotic will 
sustain the life of someone with advanced cancer, 
there is, in this view, an obligation to provide it— 
even if the final death will be worse than that tem-
porarily averted by the use of the antibiotic, and even 
if much worse than it would have been prior to the 
discovery of antibiotics. 
For my part, I can imagine no conceivable moral or 
spiritual benefit in being kept alive technologically in 
a PVS state. It is a condition actually far worse than 
that of a newly fertilized egg; the latter has a poten-
tiality for developing characteristically human traits, 
while the former has forever lost that possibility. 
F3r those who nonetheless believe there is value in preserving the life of someone in PVS, I suggest 
two questions they might put to themselves. Before 
respirators and artificial feeding existed, would they 
have wanted medical research to invent those devices 
for the sole purpose of keeping PVS patients alive? If 
one believes it a good to be kept alive in a PVS state, 
does this not imply that further research should be 
carried out to make such a thing even more possi-
ble—to keep those in that state alive longer and 
longer, even a full lifetime? 
What about the cessation of artificial nutrition 
and hydration for the PVS victim? Is that moral? 
About a decade ago, when I first began thinking 
about this issue, I was far more reluctant to support 
such cessation than I am now. Two factual discover-
ies changed my mind. The first was that artificial nu-
trition and hydration were first developed only as a 
temporary means of helping a person overcome a 
temporary inability to eat or swallow water, e.g., as 
part of the recovery process in the aftermath of an 
operation. It was only in the 1970s, after some major 
improvements in the tubing and techniques of nutri-
tion and hydration, that the procedure became more 
widespread, eventually being used routinely with 
PVS victims. My second discovery was that the in-
ability to eat, and a failing desire to eat, is itself one of 
the classical symptoms of a dying body. An inability 
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to eat was not, in the past, taken as evidence that a pa-
tient was "starving" to death, but only manifesting a 
symptom of a dying body. The word "starving" was 
only recently introduced as part of the polemics 
about artificial nutrition and hydration. 
These two discoveries led me to conclude that ex-
tended artificial nutrition and hydration for the PVS 
patient should be considered "extraordinary" treat-
ment, neither "ordinary" medical treatment nor, for 
that matter, ordinary nonmedical caring. It was only 
because, once again, technology had coopted the sanc-
tity of life principle that many came to see the cessa-
tion of artificial feeding as itself a killing. Once again, 
what had been a legitimate omission prior to the new 
technology was now turned into an act of commission. 
The perfecdy natural process whereby a dying body 
can no longer take food or water has been transmuted 
into something that has become our fault if we don't 
use the new technology to remedy the situation. 
In sum, in the argument that a PVS patient ought to . be sustained as long as possible I see the unhappy 
fruits of the three technological seductions I de-
scribed above: death by "starvation" has now become 
our fault, not nature's, if we omit treatment; the dis-
tinction between omission and commission is erased 
in the insistence that the stopping of artificial feed-
ing is the same as killing the patient and, as too often 
Gilbert Meilaender 
(An imaginary dialogue) 
GM: I have to say right at the outset, Dan, that The 
Troubled Dream of Life is a superb book. I've read 
much of what you've written over the years, and this 
is the very best—thoughtful, provocative, and even 
(as one reviewer put it) pious. Anyone who finds your 
article in this symposium worth reading will cer-
tainly want to turn to the book itself. 
DC: I'm pleased to hear you say that, Gil, especially 
since we don't agree on every aspect of these ques-
tions. Pleased as I am, though, I suspect you're not 
going to let praise have the last word. 
GM: Oh, but I will. Of course, words of praise at 
beginning and end may still bracket a few dis-
satisfactions that need probing. I'm not always 
certain that some of your points are made as precise-
ly as they should be. And in some respects I think 
you're almost too concerned with stopping the grow-
ing euthanasia movement. 
DC: Too concerned? Surely you don't mean that. 
happens, a new technology gets legitimated and rou-
tinized by an invocation of the sanctity of life. And 
just to make matters worse, the still useful and tradi-
tional distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary treatment has been corrupted, making it 
appear as if it is mere ordinary treatment to preserve 
the body of a PVS patient indefinitely. 
Perhaps there are those who believe that it is a 
great medical step forward that we can indefinitely 
sustain the lives of those who have lost their human 
potential, or who believe that the sanctity of life is en-
hanced by large numbers of permanently unrespon-
sive bodies being sustained through a network of 
feeding tubes at one end of those bodies and excretory 
tubes at the other. I think, on the contrary, that tech-
nology got the better of them once more. Medical sci-
ence is very clever in making us feel guilty about ac-
cepting the end of human life; in its hubris it has led 
us to think of death as a curable condition, or at least 
indefinitely postponable. Human life had value 
before technology came along, and if death is an 
insult to the human condition, that insult requires a 
spiritual, not scientific, remedy. 
DANIEL CALLAHAN is President of the Hastings 
Center and author of the recently published book The 
Troubled Dream of Life: Living with Mortality 
(Simon ir Schuster). 
GM: Yes I do. In order to draw a line that you think 
will work for public policy, a line that may keep eu-
thanasia from becoming legally sanctioned, you have 
to ignore the fact that we may already be there. We 
may already be deliberately letting die people who 
aren't really dying—and doing so simply because we 
think their lives aren't worth preserving. 
DC: That's a serious issue, and, as you know, I've ad-
dressed it. But don't you think it's important that we 
try to undermine the growing sentiment in support 
of euthanasia? 
GM: Of course. 
DC: Then a line that makes sense to people—such as 
the line between omission and commission—may be 
exactly what our public policy needs, even if it 
doesn't capture every distinction as precisely as we 
might like. 
GM: Perhaps that would make good sense if one 
thought the line you draw will hold forever, but I 
don't think it will. I suspect a day will come when we 
say, "Why not kill by commission? After all, we've 
been doing it by omission for a long time." 
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DC: I'm not sure I follow you. 
GM: Look, Dan, you know that I don't entirely dis-
agree with you. Certainly if someone dies because I 
shoot him, I have caused that death in a way I haven't 
if I simply do not give him medical care that he needs 
to live. 
DC: Agreed. That, indeed, is part of my point. 
GM: But will you agree that there might also be occa-
sions when I could be culpable even if I did not cause 
his death? Culpable because I failed to do for him 
what I could and should have done? 
DC: Yes, of course, though I doubt that we'd agree on 
which cases fit that description. 
GM: Probably not, but let's take what we can get for 
the moment. And let's suppose that in our society 
today there are in fact cases—more by my reckoning, 
fewer by yours—in which we are culpable for deaths 
we haven't caused. Culpable because we gladly seized 
an opportunity not to treat when in fact we should 
have treated. In such cases, then, our aim and intent 
is to bring about death—even if by omission rather 
than commission. And, therefore, I suspect a day will 
come when we look back upon this time as a transi-
tional stage on the way to approved euthanasia. In 
that day we will say, "We were already doing the 
moral equivalent of euthanasia; we just weren't yet 
prepared to call it by its right name." 
DC: I get the point all right. But I think it's a 
bad strategy to adopt; it just plays into the hands 
of those who build on current practices to win ap-
proval of euthanasia. And I still don't think you ap-
preciate sufficiently the important difference that re-
mains between omission and commission. We die be-
cause it is our nature to die. And the natural world is 
a "given" and a "limit" up against which we live. We 
cannot entirely reshape it, as if we could create our 
own world. And we shouldn't suppose that whenever 
someone dies we are responsible for not keeping him 
alive longer. Everyone must die sometime. We are not 
culpable because that day has come; yet modern med-
icine tends to make us feel as if we are. It makes us 
feel as if we must always choose life. 
GM: And so we ought. Jews and Christians, at any 
rate, have said that we should always "choose life." 
DC: But that's exactly my point. Religious believers, 
affirming (as they suppose) the sanctity of life, end 
up as slaves to our technology. They think they are 
morally obligated to follow wherever it leads. 
GM: No, I think you've got it wrong there, Dan. 
There is a kind of surface similarity between two 
quite different ways of seeing death as an enemy. 
Medical science sees it as an enemy; so does religious 
faith. But religious faith does not affirm life as the ul-
timate good to be pursued, since it accepts God as the 
limit to our plans and projects. Such faith allows us 
to acknowledge death when its time has come with-
out choosing it or aiming at it. 
DC: Are you sure that distinction you make has any 
cash value? From where I sit it looks as if you reli-
gious folk just end up always wanting to treat, and 
you never acknowledge death soon enough for that 
death to be a relatively peaceful and tolerable one. 
That's where you end up when you are never willing 
to acknowledge that life can become a burden we no 
longer wish to sustain. 
GM: Let's consider one of your own examples. You 
object to a view (my own, as you know) that we can 
reject the burdens of treatment but should not reject 
the burden of life itself. Suppose, you say, "a non-bur-
densome antibiotic will sustain the life of someone 
with advanced cancer." Are we obligated to provide 
it? Or might we not just say that, in order to avoid a 
worse final death, we can act as if antibiotics had 
never been discovered and were not available. Is that 
a fair summary of your illustrative case? 
DC: I think so. 
GM: Here's a place where more precision seems 
needed. I'm confident you don't want to say that an 
otherwise healthy twenty-year-old with a severe case 
of bacterial pneumonia may properly decline antibi-
otics—thinking thereby to avoid a worse death fifty 
years down the road. 
DC: Of course I don't. 
GM: And I, in turn, don't want to say that the person 
with "advanced cancer"—that is, one who is already 
well into his dying—must necessarily accept an an-
tibiotic. But it's important to be clear why I would 
say that. Is his life experienced as burdensome? 
Almost surely. Can we understand that he might 
want to die? Certainly. Is it morally permissible, 
therefore, for him to choose to die—to decline the an-
tibiotic so that he will die? I don't think so. 
DC: So he has to take it and suffer a worse death than 
he might otherwise have? 
GM: No. I already said he didn't have to take it. He 
doesn't have to take it because—by the very terms 
of the case—he is already dying. For him this antibi-
otic has become just as useless as many treatments for 
his cancer, since—as Paul Ramsey once put it—the 
one dying is a person and not simply an ensemble of 
diseases. 
DC: Well, that is not the way I would put the matter, 
but suppose we put it your way for the moment. 
We're still in agreement on the two cases. The 
twenty-year-old with pneumonia would be wrong to 
decline the antibiotic. The man or woman dying of 
advanced cancer would not. 
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GM: Shall we add one more version of the case and 
see whether we continue to agree? Suppose now that 
our patient is a seventy-seven-year-old man, relatively 
robust physiologically for his age, but suffering in-
creasing dementia. Suppose now that he is the one 
with pneumonia. 
DC: I suppose you'd say we ought to give him the an-
tibiotic. 
GM: Yes, I would. 
DC: Even though we may be keeping him alive to 
suffer a worse death down the road? 
GM: Who can say whether that will be the case? You 
are the one who has written—very eloquently—about 
the moral failure involved in our attempts to control 
and shape the whole of life. In this case the antibiotic 
would clearly be useful in preserving his life, and the 
treatment itself would not be a burden to him. 
DC: Yes, but his life may be a burden. 
GM: Of course. And I already granted that we might 
even wish or pray that he would die. That's quite 
understandable, and I don't think there's anything 
wrong with it. But if the burden I seek to rid him of 
is not the treatment but the life, then I fear I am doing 
more than wishing he could die. If I don't treat him 
for that reason, there would be no way to describe my 
"plan of action" other than by saying: "I won't treat 
him so that he will die." And that I wouldn't want to 
say. If the burden to be gotten rid of is his life, then 
that life is what I'm taking aim at. 
DC: Well, I doubt that we can reach agreement on 
this case. But perhaps I can press you just a bit. Are 
you going to put a feeding tube in such a patient if he 
can't or doesn't eat? You have, after all, written in de-
fense of artificial nutrition and hydration. 
GM: True. But here again we need to make some 
distinctions. Suppose we try to feed him by tube 
and he constandy pulls at it, seeming to find it bur-
densome. I wouldn't restrain him in order to feed 
him. I'd accept the fact that this treatment was bur-
densome for him. What I've noted in earlier writings, 
however, is that such an argument cannot work in the 
case of patients in a persistent vegetative state, since, 
as far as we know, they do not find a feeding tube bur-
densome. 
DC: All the worse! So we have to sustain the life of 
people in what I can only call a "zombie-like" state? 
GM: Shall we ask ourselves for a moment what the 
best way to describe these people is? One of the really 
beautiful parts of your book—a part that doesn't 
make it into what you say in your short essay here—is 
the section (in chapter 4) on "Mourning the Loss of 
the Optimal Self." You suggest that there is no ideal 
point in life at which we are most truly ourselves. 
And while granting that we cannot bear to think of 
ourselves as having lost our intellectual capacities, 
you even say: "[I]t may be no less a mistake to think 
that we must have an optimal mind than that we 
must have an optimal body." Our lives do not lack 
dignity when our mental capacities fail. I take it that 
you and I agree about that. 
DC: Yes, I think we do. But surely treatment—includ-
ing feeding by tube—for the PVS patient is a perfect 
example of futile treatment. And you yourself 
allow that we have no obligation to provide useless 
treatment. An inability to eat is a perfectly natural 
part of the process of dying. That a person in a 
persistent vegetative state cannot take in nourish-
ment is not our fault; it is simply "a symptom of a 
dying body." 
GM: If I were persuaded of that, Dan, I think we 
could agree about proper care for PVS patients. 
Indeed, when I first wrote about this question I noted 
that "at least in some cases . . . lapsing into perma-
nent coma might be a sign that a person is trying to 
die." If it is—whenever it is—I would have no moral 
objection to withholding or withdrawing a feeding 
tube. But, as you know, the true PVS patient is physi-
ologically robust; he may live for years if given nour-
ishment. It's rather hard to see such a person's failure 
to eat as a symptom of a dying body. I suspect, in fact, 
that the real symptom is our failure to feed—a symp-
tom of our profound dis-ease before one who is clear-
ly one of us yet so unlike us. 
DC: Well, if you don't like my description of these pa-
tients as dying, what alternative would you offer? 
GM: I would describe a Karen Ann Quinlan or a 
Nancy Cruzan not as a dying person but as a severely 
disabled person. Similarly, a quadriplegic is severely 
disabled and unable to feed himself, but he is not a 
dying person. The fact that he is unable to give him-
self nourishment is not a symptom of a dying body; it 
is the result of a severe injury and disability. 
DC: And in an earlier age you would have tried to de-
velop a feeding tube for the sole purpose of keeping 
alive a person in a persistent vegetative state? 
GM: I would have tried to do anything I thought 
might benefit the life the person has. That doesn't 
necessarily mean developing a feeding tube. It might 
mean spending hours trying to provide some nour-
ishment by mouth. That such an attempt would fail 
is no doubt true, but, as you well know, we don't have 
an obligation to succeed. 
DC: Let's talk more another time. 
GM: Agreed. And, Dan, it really is an excellent book. 
GILBERT MEILAENDER teaches in the Department of 
Religion at Oberlin College. 
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William B. Smith 
Daniel Callahan is surely correct that stern propo-nents and opponents of euthanasia can share the 
same obsession—control. Some medical types resent 
death because it seems outside their technical "con-
trol"; some pro-choice types resent any suffering or 
discomfort, again outside their "control/' 
Life control, birth control, death control—there is 
a controlling logic here, a gnostic "worldly" wisdom 
that does not like the world we h^ve been given and 
by supreme effort seeks to construct a world that can 
be controlled. 
No convinced Christian is obliged to prolong life 
"indefinitely/' nor should he even try. Medicalizing 
technology to prolong life indefinitely is as futile as it 
is obscene. But I would differ with Callahan on what 
motivates the obsessed controllers; I doubt that it is 
fear of non-beneficial benefits as much as it is loss of 
belief in the afterlife. 
Guessing at motives aside, what I fear is the loose 
use of language, especially by bean counters who will 
find some system (rationing, rating, capitation) to de-
clare non-beneficial benefits not cost-effective and 
thus no longer available. 
When functional definitions are wedded to finan-
cial decisions, some folks are going to be defined off 
the human list. I take it as a guiding principle that all 
social engineering is preceded by verbal engineer-
ing. Thus, I am reluctant to accept neologisms and 
am uneasy with such terms as "merely physiological 
existence," or "biologically tenacious individuals," 
or, as Daniel Callahan would have it, "the zombie-
like life of the PVS victim." 
In time, words shape (engineer) the deeds we do 
and sanction. Not long ago, there were special provi-
sions in place ensuring that, in most instances, assist-
ed nutrition and hydration was outside the category 
of "extraordinary" care for PVS patients. Legally, 
this is no longer the case. Legally, the list of patients 
deserving human care is shorter today. On the caring 
list, PVS is now an unlisted number—not only in the 
dying context where nothing more reasonable can be 
done, but now in the chronic cases who are simply 
not dying fast enough. 
What has changed so fast in so few years? I sus-pect not the discovery of some medical history 
about what motives helped introduce some new tech-
nology, nor the announcement that it is symptomatic 
of the dying body not to want food. The latter simply 
begs the question by smuggling the word "dying" 
into the description, thus verbally converting a 
chronic case into a dying one. 
What has changed, I think, is a bit of verbal engi-
neering. Where Callahan focuses on "potential for 
development," others speak of capacity for "cogni-
tive-affective" behavior. If or when that potential or 
capacity is lost for the PVS patient, then the human 
status deserving of medical-nursing care is lost as 
well. When we draw that kind of quality-of-life func-
tional line, some folks are going to qualify and some 
won't. 
The PVS designation is treated as a label whose 
time has come. It is presented as an air-tight scientif-
ic diagnosis as stringent in its discovery as it is unar-
guable in its outcomes. Indeed, some professional 
groups (or spokesmen for same) have so declared. 
Long ago, T. S. Eliot warned us: "words spread." I 
may be slower than others, but I do not find in the lit-
erature absolute statements of the clinical factors 
unanimously agreed to by medical professionals 
defining PVS. Such unanimity would be important 
when the PVS label automatically removes someone 
from the human care list. 
I accept the conventional ordinary/extraordinary 
distinction of received Christian teaching: ordinary 
= obligatory; extraordinary = optional. I further 
accept the definition of euthanasia put forward by 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) 
in its Declaration On Euthanasia (1980): "Any act or 
omission which of itself or by intention causes 
death." I also accept the CDF view that "when in-
evitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, 
it is permitted . . . to refuse forms of treatment that 
would only secure a precarious and burdensome pro-
longation of life, so long as the normal care due to 
the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted." 
"Imminent" in the above view is to be understood 
as hours or days, not six months or a year. Also, while 
the failed "treatment" aspect of the above quote is 
often cited, the qualification—"so long as the normal 
care. . . not [be] interrupted"—is often omitted. 
The CDF Declaration addresses but does not pre-
cisely answer all cases of PVS. An excellent resource 
paper of the U.S. Bishops Pro-Life Committee issued 
in 1992 further specifies the assisted nutrition and 
hydration question ("Nutrition and Hydration: 
Moral and Pastoral Reflections"). Wisely, in my view, 
the U.S. Bishops did not try to resolve every PVS situ-
ation case antecedently, but they did propose a nu-
anced statement of correct principles and presump-
tions that are helpful in the resolution of each PVS 
situation—case by case. This case-specific approach 
seems wiser to me than a one-size-fits-all label that is 
scientifically unavailable and morally dubious. 
In the non-dying context, the presumption is for assisted N&H unless specific pathological factors 
urge otherwise. Often, unfortunately, the clinical fac-
tors do not turn the moral fulcrum but rather legal 
and procedural elements do: family wishes, signed 
directives. We live in a society that seems more con-
cerned with signing the right forms than with doing 
the right thing. Procedural ethics continue to swamp 
and consume substantive ethics at every turn and in 
every context. The fact-specific calculus may not sit 
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well with the legal mind, but common or general 
laws seem uncommonly clumsy instruments for such 
fine-line detail. 
There are exceptions to the pro-N&H presump-
tion. Surely, for a patient who can no longer assimi-
late food, N&H provides no benefit; similarly, some 
stomach cancer cases result in feeding the tumor in-
stead of the patient; and there are those who are so 
fragile that almost any invasive insert causes more 
problems than it relieves. 
In these cases, I assume death is truly imminent. 
But in the chronic case, where the patient is not 
in imminent danger of death, the omission of assisted 
N&H is a lethal omission, for by that omission we 
set in motion a chain of events known to be death-
dealing. 
Of what benefit is this assistance? The support— 
caring even where there is no curing—affirms 
human solidarity in both directions: care-giver and 
care-receiver. It is a human virtue to care for those 
who cannot care for themselves, and in that act of 
caring we affirm that it is a human person we care 
for—not some mere physiological process. After all, 
we water live plants with regularity. Do our own 
kind deserve less? 
But once the "potential for development" sock is 
fitted to all PVS patients, how does one control the 
logic of that functional standard? There are some 
persons so badly compromised at birth that they do 
not or never will have such potential. I don't suggest 
that doctors and nurses will not feed them, but I'm 
not sure the bean counters will. 
Some judge, in some jurisdiction, will soon discov-
er that someone's "right to privacy" is broad enough 
to include the "right" not to care, or that suicide or as-
sisted suicide are implicit in the "concept of ordered 
liberty." Several courts have already sanctioned dehy-
dration as the "treatment of choice"—if it is so 
chosen by the patient, or by the patient's proxy. 
In my view, the PVS situation should be considered 
case by case with agonizing attention to case-specific 
detail. A one-size-fits-all label seems to simplify a dif-
ficult matter, but it simplifies too much by simply re-
moving a whole category of persons from the human 
care list. 
About that removal, bean counters may have no 
scruples; but ethicists should. 
MSGR. WILLIAM B. SMITH is Prof essor of Moral Theol-
ogy at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, in Yonkers, 
New York. 
M. Thérèse Lysaught 
How can a theologian resist commending Daniel Callahan for his closing line: "[I]f death is an 
insult to the human condition, that insult requires a 
spiritual, not scientific, remedy"? This insight in 
itself makes Callahan's an important article. Over-
all, I agree with him, I disagree with him, and I want 
him to push the logic of his argument to a more com-
plete conclusion. 
Where do we agree? He is correct that it is crucial 
to maintain the moral distinction between acts of 
omission and commission. Further, his analysis of 
the relationship between medicine, technology, and 
the fact of death is compelling, although ultimately 
he gives too much agency to technology: it is primar-
ily the ideology behind technology, and not the tech-
nology itself, that does the damage. And finally, I ap-
preciate his challenge to recover the distinction be-
tween ordinary and extraordinary treatment; this 
would certainly be a helpful, practical first step in be-
ginning the process of reassessing and reordering 
our relationship with technologies at the end of life. 
Where do we disagree? This retrieval of the ordi-
nary/extraordinary distinction is more a "scientific" 
solution than a "spiritual" one, and I am concerned 
that this technique alone will, in the end, primarily 
treat a symptom rather than cure the disease. For as 
Callahan rightly notes, our captivity to technology 
results from its implicit ideology—our confusion 
over the meaning of death. But while his solution— 
recovering a notion of death as natural—could alle-
viate the agony of particular dying individuals and 
their caregivers, I am not convinced this will effec-
tively ameliorate those conditions that impel public 
opinion toward the "potentially disastrous" outcomes 
of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Why? The problem lies with the notion of the "nat-
ural." Natural can be construed in two diametrically 
opposed ways. On the one hand, we live in a culture 
that is thoroughly Baconian, evidenced best in capi-
talist expansion and medical pioneering. In this 
view, nature, especially construed as raw, unfettered, 
unpredictable power, is there to be mastered, over-
come, shaped, and directed to meet human needs and 
ends. To be human is to control nature, to decide how 
it will serve human ends. Within this framework, 
therefore, to define death as merely natural may well 
fuel the impetus to denaturalize it, to work to over-
come it. This is one source of the tyranny of technolo-
gy and may well only further it. 
σ
ι the other hand, understanding death as a nat­
ural event may further fuel the impetus toward 
euthanasia and assisted suicide: if death is merely nat­
ural—the end of a reasonable span of a full and 
meaningful life with nothing to be feared—it may 
well be fully rational, completely reasonable, to end it 
when the capacities of (natural) life no longer meet 
the needs, goals, and wishes of the individual. Cer­
tainly Jack Kevorkian and his patients accept death 
as natural. 
Thus, Callahan is correct that implicit in the tyran­
ny of technology is the ideology of our understanding 
of death. But here his logic compels him to go further: 
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implicit in our understanding of death is the ideology 
of the autonomous individual, in short, our anthro-
pology. Clearly, Callahan recognizes that anthropol-
ogy is central to the problem; he notes that our cul-
ture places "excessive emphasis on choice and self-de-
termination," and that this compels us to want to find 
a human decision behind every death. But he does not 
pursue this further. It is this anthropology that must 
be addressed; this is the spiritual issue at stake. 
That the issue at stake is a spiritual one is evident 
in the religious imagery that pervades Callahan's ac-
count of technological medicine: that the war on 
death is a search for "immortality"; that the dying pa-
tient might be "saved"; that medicine is seen as "om-
nipotent, holding life and death wholly in its hands"; 
that a lobbyist equates heart attacks, cancer, and 
strokes with sin (interesting rhetoric in the public 
sphere, but I'll save that discussion for another day). 
In most cultures, questions of immortality, salva-
tion, sin, and the meaning of death have been an-
swered and continue to be answered within religious 
traditions. Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and 
so on recognize a power in life—identified with a 
sense of the sanctity of life—and a power in death, in-
sofar as death seems to overcome, eliminate, evacuate 
the power of life. But generally, life is not considered 
essentially sacred, that is, in and of itself. Rather, it is 
considered sacred because it is a gift from the source 
that holds the power of life. It is a gift held in trust; a 
gift to be returned to the giver throughout the course 
of life in the form of worship, procreation, a good 
life, and finally in death. In short, life derives both its 
limits as well as its meaning from a wider context or-
dered to interrelated ends—nature, community, and/ 
or relationship with the transcendent. Likewise, 
human bearers of that life draw their identity, self-
understanding, and the meaning and limits of their 
agency from a context ordered to ends beyond their 
individual choosing or effecting. 
Wie have, however, lost our sense of being part of anything larger than our single selves. The Ba-
conian turn demythologized nature and the Enlight-
enment elevated the autonomous human individual 
to the status of the transcendent. No longer does 
human life—and correlatively human dying and 
death—draw its meaning from the context within 
which it is situated, be that the rhythms of nature or 
the story of God-in-history. Human life is now essen-
tially sacred rather than sacred by participation. 
Consequently, "salvation" becomes equivalent either 
with the prolongation of biological human life at all 
costs or with individual control over the way a partic-
ular life ends. Medicine and medical technology have 
become our soteriology. 
Thus, the problem is not so much that technology 
has seduced the sanctity of life. Rather, individual-
ism and autonomy have seduced the meaning of 
human life, and therefore, the meaning of human 
death. Human persons have become idols, wor-
shipped as ends in themselves, cut off from any sort 
of context that might provide them with meaning. 
We don't know who we are, we don't know how to 
live (well), we don't know how to talk together about 
these questions, and we don't know how to die. This 
is precisely a spiritual crisis. 
Callahan has taken an important step toward over-
coming the tragedies of lives unnecessarily pro-
longed by out-of-control medical technology. He has 
helpfully challenged the idolatry of technology, but 
the problem of idolatrizing human life remains. The 
problems of euthanasia and assisted suicide point us 
to deeper spiritual questions: questions of human 
identity, agency, control, finitude, and humility 
before the aspects of reality that truly transcend 
human existence. These are first questions of how to 
live well before they are questions of when to die and 
how to die peacefully. 
M. THÉRÈSE LYSAUGHT is an Associate at the Park 
Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and 
Ethics in Chicago. 
Caroline Whitbeck 
Diniel Callahan makes a constructive contribu-tion to the discussion of medical interventions at 
the end of life by emphasizing that the dying person 
often ceases to want or take food, not because of de-
pression or out of an attempt to starve to death, but 
because his or her body can no longer metabolize 
food. He is to be commended for abandoning his ear-
lier position that the dying should be fed, even 
against their wishes. 
The middle class in the United States is unused to 
seeing death, or birth either. (The white middle class 
may be especially culturally deprived.) Ignorance of 
many matters of birth and death often leads people— 
medical ethicists, patients and their families, and 
even health care providers—to make misinformed or 
inadvertently cruel decisions. It is nurses and nurses' 
aids who now attend women in labor, care for new-
borns, and provide most of the care of those who are 
seriously ill or dying. For most of humanity these as-
pects of what we regard as nursing care are provided 
by family or neighbors. 
It has become common for us to have serious deci-
sion-making responsibilities when we are facing one 
of our first experiences attending a dying person. 
Most of us are doubly unprepared: we do not under-
stand the constandy changing array of medical op-
tions, and our culture's obsession with self-determi-
nation has permitted us to turn away from uncom-
fortable realities of the human condition because they 
are relegated to our "private lives." As a result most of 
us are seriously unprepared for some of our most im-
portant responsibilities for those closest to us. 
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Medical ethics might have made a concerted effort to overcome the dangerous ignorance of the 
American middle class, but it has not. The dominant 
voices have not been those of nurses and other 
providers of care informing us about medical inter-
ventions, nor the voices of patients and families who 
have faced these experiences, nor those of the lay and 
ordained pastoral caregivers who have supported 
and advised members of their faith communities as 
they tried to understand and respond well to these 
complex and frightening situations. 
The dominant voices in medical ethics in the last 
twenty years have largely sought to fit wrenching 
human problems to abstract models, especially the 
model of "dilemmas," that is, "forced choices between 
two equally unacceptable options." Such abstract 
representations have distorted those problems and 
often undermined public understanding of them. A 
common approach to resolving the artificial abstract 
problems is to propose general "principles" from 
which one might simply deduce a response. 
In the last decade major figures from Alasdair 
Maclntyre to Annette Baier, Stephen Toulmin, and 
Albert Jonsen have offered a variety of powerful ar-
guments against abstract approaches to ethics and, in 
particular, against the attempt to address moral 
problems by formulating "principles." Objecting to 
the formulation of such abstract principles does not 
require that one altogether dispense with principles 
in moral argument. I agree with Maclntyre that al-
though there are no timeless, ahistorical principles 
or moral rules, there are enduring principles, princi-
ples linked to a domain of application and that have 
stood the test of time, "surviving a wide range of chal-
lenges and objections, perhaps undergoing limited 
reformations or changes in how [they are] under-
stood, but retaining [their] basic identity through the 
history of [their] applications." 
Moral change does not necessarily require for-mulation of new principles, however. For ex-
ample, some hospitals, such as the teaching hospital 
in which I help teach the students from the Harvard-
MIT Program in Health Sciences and Technology, 
have made significant changes in their policies in the 
last few years. Thus it is no longer their policy to at-
tempt resuscitation on any patient who undergoes 
cardiac arrest unless there is a "Do Not Resuscitate" 
(DNR) order. Such changes are certainly due in part 
to the recognition that the attempt to resuscitate 
often breaks the bones of an older patient's breast 
plate, a condition from which the patient never re-
covers and which causes the patient great pain. 
(Hospital policies have also been influenced by 
recognition that the concentrations of the HIV virus 
rise significantly in dying AIDS patients, and most 
health care workers who have contracted AIDS from 
their patients have done so performing interventions 
like cardiopulmonary resuscitation with dying pa-
tients. Therefore, reforms such as changes in policies 
about the necessity of DNR orders may be less 
common in regions where there have been fewer 
AIDS patients.) 
It is heartening to see Callahan take account of 
some particulars about dying, but he does not go far 
enough. I agree that the difficult problems surround-
ing health care at the end of life ought never to have 
been constructed as a dilemma with involuntary eu-
thanasia at the bottom of one slippery slope and 
force-feeding of dying patients at the bottom of an-
other. But why should we blame "technology" for this 
construction? There is a criticism to be made of our 
common expectations of technology. Stephen Lam-
mers has made the point that our society regularly 
looks to technology to solve perennial human prob-
lems. Such problems as suffering and death are ones 
that we cannot solve, however; we can only cope with 
them. The difficulty is not with technology but with 
our unrealistic expectations of it. 
The construction of a forced choice between invol-
untary euthanasia and force-feeding of the dying (or 
those in a persistent vegetative state) arises from inat-
tention to the actual situation. As one moves closer to 
the situation the illusion of a slippery slope disap-
pears and some levels of terracing become clear. 
However, neither the principles nor the distinctions 
that Callahan offers take us very far. 
Callahan's first principle—that "no one should have to die a worse death as a result of medical 
technology than would have been the case prior to 
the invention of that technology"—helps only with 
the few cases in which one is certain how and when 
the patient will die if treated. Most cases are like the 
one I encountered some years ago at one of the med-
ical schools at which I taught. A Roman Catholic 
priest, who was showing signs of rejecting a trans-
planted kidney, clearly expressed the desire, if and 
when the transplant failed, to die in the company of 
his friends, also religious, who visited him regularly. 
He expressed great concern that he not die alone and 
that his death not be dominated by medical interven-
tions. 
The person who brought the example to my atten-
tion was a young nurse, a Roman Catholic herself, 
who understood the priest's expression as not merely 
a preference but a spiritual concern in keeping with 
his whole set of religious convictions. She was grati-
fied that the priest's physician was fully supportive. 
One Monday the nurse returned after a weekend 
off to find that the priest had gone into crisis. The 
priest's regular physician was away and the physi-
cian in charge had begun a vigorous effort to "save 
the life" of the priest. It was not certain when the in-
tervention began that the conclusion would be death. 
However, that was the result. The priest died, isolated 
from his spiritual support and surrounded by a 
flurry of medical activity. The nurse was appalled at 
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this betrayal of the priest's trust. She was confident 
that the priest's own physician would have permitted 
comfort measures only. 
This was a worse death, but it was not fully pre-
dictable when the intervention began. Furthermore, 
it is not by some applicable-to-all "quality of death" 
measure that this death is judged worse. Identical in-
terventions might have been quite appropriate with 
another patient in the same medical circumstances 
but for whom surviving to see the birth of a grand-
child held special meaning. What was wrong with 
the care of the priest can be understood only in rela-
tion to the practices by which the sacred was recog-
nized and celebrated in this person's life. 
The distinction between ordinary and extraordi-
nary fails for many of the same reasons as Callahan's 
first principle, although I certainly agree that it is 
wrongheaded to seek to force on patients "any non-
burdensome treatment that will sustain life, whatev-
er the condition of that life." 
The word "ordinary" can be heard in many differ-
ent ways, such as: what is routine (at this facility); 
what is covered by health insurance; what is an estab-
lished, as contrasted with an experimental, treat-
ment. The language of ordinary/extraordinary is 
dangerous since it is likely to be misunderstood. In 
one widely known case a couple who witnessed a 
series of harrowing interventions on their newborn 
child after they had specified "no heroic measures" 
said, "It all looked heroic to us." The staff had inter-
preted their words to allow all procedures that were 
routine in the newborn intensive care facility. 
The criteria of "burden" and "benefit" that Calla-
han specifies for application of the ordinary/extraor-
dinary distinction are vague. As with the criteria for 
his first principle, these fail to take into account the 
uncertainty that prevails about the results of medical 
interventions, and do not consider such specifics as 
the place of practices in which the person experiences 
or participates in the sacred. Surely these ought to be 
a part of any consideration of the sanctity of life. 
Even the established distinction between omission 
and commission may cause confusion, especially if 
not tempered with the principle of double effect. 
Many of the medications for severe pain also depress 
respiration and so hasten death. Families often face a 
double bind—either risk killing their loved one, or 
risk letting the person suffer unnecessarily. They 
escape that double bind by refusing to have their 
family members die at home—which may have worse 
results yet. 
Callahan's second principle addresses health care providers, or at least physicians. Let us interpret 
it as a specification of the physician's responsibilities 
rather than, literally, as a stipulation of what physi-
cians should feel. Locating moral responsibility with 
people is better than scapegoating "technology." 
However, the question of a person's participation in 
meaningful practices is a matter about which physi-
cians may not be knowledgeable. For example, sup-
pose that a given patient now either dying or in a 
PVS had experienced the risk of starvation for some 
period in life. Contrast this patient with another 
with the same medical profile but who had fasting (as 
an aid to spiritual centering) as a part of his or her 
spiritual practice. Supposing the patient to have any 
awareness of the care being given, might not the ces-
sation of feeding be different in the two cases because 
of the difference in the meaning of hunger for the 
two? For the first patient one might continue giving 
food after antibiotics had been stopped, but do the re-
verse for the second. 
My arguments and examples are meant to illus-
trate how the role of what Alasdair Maclntyre and 
Stanley Hauerwas call "internal goods" need to be 
considered in forming policies about medical care. 
As they argue, ethics has gone astray by focusing ex-
clusively on "external goods," that is, on the goods 
that are the external ends or goals of some activity or 
practice. (For example, producing crops is the exter-
nal goal of farming.) The goods that are continually 
neglected are those that are internal to the practice, 
that is, those that are achieved in the practice. Hauer-
was gives as examples of practices with significant 
internal goods, baseball and the worship of God. 
A good death is to be understood not only in terms 
of the relative absence of pain and disability but also 
in terms of whether we keep faith with each other and 
ensure that the dying are neither betrayed, aban-
doned, nor invaded in the care they receive, in partic-
ular, that recognition and support is given those spir-
itual concerns that have been central to their lives. 
CAROLINE WHITBECK is a philosopher of science, 
technology, and medicine at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. Her book Understanding Moral 
Problems will be published next year by Cambridge 
University Press. 
William E. May 
TXaniel Callahan is quite correct, I believe, in 
U saying that one of the principal reasons for the 
growing acceptance of euthanasia in our society is 
the legitimate fear many have of a "technologically 
induced bad death for themselves and their family 
members." It is crucially important to respect the 
right of competent patients, and of persons charged 
with the care of those whom the late Paul Ramsey 
termed "voiceless" patients, to refuse burdensome 
and useless treatments. This was the precise issue ex-
amined so thoroughly and competently by Germain 
Grisez and Joseph Boyle in their very important, but 
unfortunately little noticed, study, Life and Death 
with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Eu-
thanasia Debate, published in 1979. 
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Callahan is also quite correct in recognizing the 
crucial moral difference between killing and allow-
ing a person to die his or her own death, inasmuch as 
it can be morally right to withhold or withdraw life-
prolonging measures when their employment is 
unduly burdensome and/or useless. Yet Callahan, I 
fear, too easily equates "allowing a person to die" 
with acts of omission. Some acts of omission are 
lethal, because they are adopted precisely as a means 
to bring about someone's death. As the Declaration 
on Euthanasia prepared by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith in 1980 correcdy observed, "By 
euthanasia is understood an action or an omission 
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order 
that all suffering may in this way be eliminated." 
This brings us to the central issue of Callahan's essay, the proper care of persons in the so-called 
"persistent vegetative state." Callahan's basic argu-
ment, so it seems to me, is that we ought not provide 
these persons with food and hydration by tubal 
means because their lives are of no value to them. He 
has passed, so it seems to me, from judging whether a 
treatment is burdensome and/or useless to a person to 
judging that some individuals' lives are burdensome 
and/or useless to them. He describes their lives as 
"zombie-like," and says that the condition is "actually 
worse than that of a newly fertilized egg" (I'll return 
to the question of the "fertilized egg" below). The im-
plicit judgment is that persons in the so-called PVS 
condition are better off dead than alive and that, 
therefore, it is of no use or value to them to be given 
the food and water necessary to sustain their burden-
some and useless lives. But if it is indeed true that the 
lives of PVS persons are of no value to them and it is 
morally legitimate to withhold or withdraw food 
and hydration from them in order to relieve them of 
the burdensomeness of their useless lives, then surely 
it would be morally legitimate to hasten their deaths, 
which would undoubtedly be prolonged were they 
not to be fed or hydrated, by some active means. 
Callahan also presupposes that PVS persons are in 
the process of dying. At one time I shared this presup-
position, but I have since learned that this is not the 
case. In fact, the American Academy of Neurology 
has explicitly recognized that such persons are not in 
danger of imminent death because of their condition, 
a matter well brought out by the Catholic Bishops of 
Pennsylvania in their carefully constructed state-
ment, "Nutrition and Hydration: Moral Considera-
tions." 
With regard to Callahan's comparison of the lives 
of PVS patients with the lives of "fertilized eggs," I 
would simply note that once an egg has been fertil-
ized it is no longer an egg but a new living being, and 
in the case of the human species, a new human 
being—surely a being of incomparably greater value 
than an tíegg." 
Callahan poses two questions for those who, like me, believe there is value in preserving 
the life of someone in a PVS state. The first is whether 
they would have wanted medical research to invent 
respirators and artificial feeding for the sole purpose 
of keeping PVS patients alive. To this I answer first 
that I do not think it morally obligatory to keep 
PVS patients alive by the means of respirators, for 
their use would, I believe, be unduly burdensome. 
I likewise do not think that I would have wanted 
medical research to invent artificial feeding for 
the sole purpose of keeping PVS patients alive, 
because it is quite evident that tubal means of provid-
ing food and nourishment are valuable for persons 
suffering from various sorts of disorders, and that 
they are also of value for PVS patients. Callahan 
also asks whether the belief that it is good for a 
person in the PVS state to be kept alive does not 
also imply that "further research should be carried 
out to make that even more possible, to keep those in 
that state alive longer and longer, even a full life-
time." To this I answer that the issue of "further re-
search" raises a whole host of questions regarding al-
location of our resources. It would be preferable, in 
my judgment, to allocate resources to the alleviation 
and prevention of many other disorders, to the pre-
vention of persons from becoming injured to such an 
extent that they are in the PVS state, and to investi-
gate avenues of helping improve the condition of 
PVS patients. 
In conclusion, I believe that Eugene F. Diamond's 
comments in the Linacre Quarterly (February 1992), 
reflecting on the Pennsylvania Bishops' Statement, 
are pertinent. Dr. Diamond observed: "The focus of 
the debate [over providing PVS patients with food 
and hydration] should be kept where it belongs. It is 
not about the terminally ill patient who is imminent-
ly dying and who will die anyway whether or not 
food and drink are continued by whatever means. 
The issue relates to the patient who is not dying but 
rather is being provided food and drink by so-called 
'artificial' means because of inability to feed himself. 
. . . For such a patient, tube feeding is useful, in that it 
sustains his life, and is not excessively burdensome be-
cause it can be provided at low cost and by unskilled 
personnel." 
WILLIAM E. MAY is Michael J. McGivney Professor of 
Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for Stud-
ies of Marriage and Family. Ignatius Press recently 
published his translation of the second Italian edition 
of Ramon Garcia de Haro's Marriage and Family in 
the Documents of the Magisterium. 
Eric Cassell 
Physicians are a pragmatic group devoted to action. In caring for the kinds of patients Daniel 
Callahan discusses they rarely say to themselves, 
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"I'm going to save Smith's life," or, "I'm not going to 
let Jones die," even when they are doing just those 
things. Instead, the situation in front of them—Smith 
sick as spit or Jones dying—is converted by their 
thinking into a specific medical (technical) problem. 
Smith had a heart attack and is going into shock. 
Heart attacks present distinct problems calling for 
defined actions. Transfer to the Cardiac Care Unit. 
Start this or that medication. Attend to the monitors, 
alert to certain events that threaten. Possibly going 
into shock? Place a Swann-Ganz catheter to monitor 
pulmonary wedge pressure. Put in an A line to moni-
tor the blood pressure. Consider aortic balloon 
counter pulsation. And so on. Each act in the here 
and now, concerned only with the present. Each act is 
an instrumental goal in itself that supports the 
saving of Smith's life. The larger goal is pushed 
aside, however, by technology and the medical sci-
ence on which it is based, and multiple subsidiary 
goals are substituted. At the bedside, doctors are un-
comfortable about philosophical issues because they 
get in the way of action. 
The same is true of keeping Jones from dying even 
if Jones is a demented old lady who hasn't looked or 
acted like a responsive human being in months. 
There she lies, mouth .open, eyes shut, contracted 
limbs and bedsores for all to see. Her blood culture 
showed bacteria so the doctor treats that infection. 
She is dehydrated so she gets fluids intravenously. She 
cannot eat. A feeding tube is inserted. Back in med-
ical school, her doctor took a course in ethics and pa-
tients like Jones were discussed. Should they be kept 
alive? Is food or fluid like any other treatment? The 
doctor believed that it was inhumane to keep such 
people alive. Yet here he is, doing just what he didn't 
believe in. Afraid of the Chief of Medicine, the hospi-
tal counsel, and what the other house staff might say. 
For keeping Jones alive there are established proce-
dures and guidelines for treatment. For allowing the 
patient to die no such guidelines yet exist. Hannah 
Arendt's banality of evil is forced to mind, but now 
banality just as thoughtlessly in the service of benevo-
lence. 
Why? Because all the technical issues involved in 
the cases—from the anatomical definition of coro-
nary artery disease to the readout on the monitor for 
blood pressure—are abstractions from the lives of 
these patients. These serve wonderfully well as guides 
for the actions of physicians when patients can repre-
sent themselves. How about in the care of Jones, who 
hasn't been self-determining for ages? Here, medical 
abstractions are inadequate representations of the 
person who is Mrs. Jones. 
What is meant by Smith's or Jones' life in this context? In fact, who is Smith in the CCU? Or 
Jones lying in her bed? Their doctors hardly know 
anything about them, not because they cannot, but 
because they are not trained to find out. Both pa-
tients are in the throes of illness, something from 
which no life is ever free. Over the centuries, but par-
ticularly in the last two hundred years, two reductive 
steps have moved medicine away from the complex 
social, psychological, and personal dimensions of ill-
ness. The first step was to substitute the modern idea 
of "disease" for the illness. The second step was the 
introduction of medical science and its purely bio-
logical view of disease. And the consequent technolo-
gies (X-ray, laboratory test, EKGs, etc.) that allow 
medicine to consider diseases at a distance from the 
patient. 
These two strategies have led to the phenomenal 
advances of biomedicine and the conquest (nothing 
less) of many diseases. Alas, they have also fooled 
everyone (including doctors) into the wrongheaded 
notion that the fundamental personal problems of 
life and death—bonding, growing, developing, be-
coming, being, declining, leaving, and grieving—are 
also open to technological fixes. Of which euthana-
sia and legalized assisted suicide are just two exam-
ples. It is not medicine or science that is the enemy, 
but the continued abstraction from the real life of 
real humans of which they are both the parents and 
the children. 
I believe that Daniel Callahan is incorrect in sug-
gesting that physicians have coopted the principle of 
the sanctity of life. They share it with the rest of their 
culture. It is not only medicine that urges the contin-
ued treatment of patients like Jones or those in a per-
sistent vegetative state. Nor doctors alone who do not 
want to remove feeding tubes and the like. I think he 
is also wrong in believing that the courts are long-
standing champions of allowing the hopelessly ill a 
way out. There may even have been commentators in 
these pages who strongly argued—in the name of 
life's sanctity—the error of allowing someone to die 
by removing nutrition and hydration. What is the life 
that is sacred, the body's life, the person's life, Jones' 
life? In most discussions it is not life in the sense that 
you and I know or live it, but some abstraction as 
remote from Smith and Jones as the doctors' techno-
logical abstractions. 
At the end of the nineteenth century it appeared as 
though Western culture was beginning to come to 
terms with human life as persons actually live it. In 
this century, however, the project has faltered. In-
stead, it has been reductionist and oversimplifying in 
its sciences (including social science), graphic arts, 
music, and philosophy. Little wonder that ethics as 
much as medicine is cursed by abstractions that sepa-
rate them from the richness of human existence. 
Things are changing, though, and again the com-
plexity of the real is forcing itself into cultural con-
sciousness (evident not only in recent trends in medi-
cine and ethics—witness Callahan—but the arts and 
philosophy as well). In examining the issues raised 
by Callahan, we must return to the hard reality of the 
cases and the phenomena involved. It is this sick 
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person we should concern ourselves with, not some 
ghostly abstraction. 
ERIC CASSELL, M.D., is a practicing internist in New 
York City and an attending physician at the New York 
Hospital. He is Clinical Professor of Public Health at 
Cornell University Medical College. His booL· in-
clude The Healer's Art, The Place of the Humanités 
in Medicine, Changing Values in Medicine, and, 
most recently, The Nature of Suffering. 
Daniel Callahan replies 
My commentators have raised important issues and advanced some potent objections. I appre-
ciate that. Yet I was immediately struck by how little 
was actually said about the main issue on my mind, 
that of the power of technology to distort our think-
ing about matters of life and death. Eric Cassell, who 
has written in a penetrating way elsewhere on tech-
nology, only alludes to it here, while Caroline Whit-
beck and M. Thérèse Lysaught are the only ones who 
really mention it directly at all. But Whitbeck thinks 
the only problem is with our "unrealistic expecta-
tions" of technology, while Lysaught believes the real 
problem is "the ideology behind technology." 
I am reminded here of a common slogan of those 
who oppose any serious limits on the availability of 
hand guns: "It is not guns that kill, but people," as if 
the widespread availability of guns themselves had 
nothing to do with the high rate of death by guns. As 
happens in medicine as well, that kind of attitude un-
derestimates the independent (if sometimes uncanny) 
power of technology to shape us, those who think we 
only shape it. The availability of medical technolo-
gies changes the way we think about their use and the 
way we think about the life and death that they can 
influence. 
I would note in this respect two points of historical 
significance, one bearing on medical progress, the 
other on the way technological advances reshape our 
thinking. My first point is that just about all of the 
major debates of late on the care of the dying have 
been occasioned by the advent, and then routinized 
use of, a relatively new technology. It was not until 
the 1960s that there was any significant argument 
about turning off respirators or extending the life of 
low birthweight babies in neonatal ICU units 
(NICUS). Neither respirators nor NICUS were much 
used before that time. It was not until the early 1980s 
that the debate over artificial nutrition and hydration 
emerged, mainly because it was only in the 1970s that 
such a form of treatment came into widespread and 
routine use because of technological improvements. 
I conclude that the great, and still unappreciated, 
problem is what to think and do about technological 
innovation—and particularly that form of innovation 
that does not cure but is able to keep a severely ill or 
damaged person alive but in terrible shape. We will 
see more and more of such nasty "progress" in the 
future. A difference between my critics and me is that 
they seem to assume that if a new technology comes 
along that can sustain life, the benefit of any doubt 
must be toward the use of that technology. In no case, 
moreover, ought we be allowed to take into account 
the kind of life, or the burden of life, that the new tech-
nology may create or allow to be sustained. By con-
trast, I am trying to work with the notion that we 
should be free not to use a new technology—to give it 
no benefit of the doubt at all—and in any case not use 
it if it promises us a worse burden of both treatment 
and life than was the case before it appeared. 
Gilbert Meilaender, William E. May, and William B. Smith seem to think that since we can now 
technologically keep PVS patients going by technol-
ogy, therefore we must do so, that some traditional 
moral principles compel us. If they are correct, then 
we should either reconsider those principles to make 
them more technology-resistant, or ask whether they 
really exact such obeisance to technological possibil-
ity. In any case, I want to find a better way to distance 
ourselves from the technological imperative; they 
seem to me in danger of being captured by it. 
My second historical point turns on the way tech-
nological change leads us to redefine some basic con-
cepts. May and Smith think that a person in a PVS 
state is "disabled," not "dying." Recollect, however, 
that when Karen Ann Quinlan's respirator was 
turned off in the mid-1970s there was every expecta-
tion she would die, and great surprise when she did 
not. Such patients were not then thought "physically 
robust" at all, to use Meilaender's phrase. Until that 
point in medical history, a person in a PVS state or-
dinarily died in a relatively short time: hence, to be a 
person in a PVS state was to be a dying person. 
My surmise is that it was precisely the improved 
methods of artificial nutrition and hydration, plus 
other medical advances, that made it possible by the 
mid-1970s to keep Karen Ann Quinlan alive so long 
(ten years). Biological inevitability could be fore-
stalled by medical ingenuity. Yet for just this histori-
cal reason, it is perfecdy reasonable to refer still to 
people in PVS as biologically dying, not simply dis-
abled. The fact that we can arrest, or suspend, the un-
derlying fatal condition for a time, even a long time, 
does not change the underlying biological reality: a 
PVS patient has been captured by a fatal condition 
which, if we do not artificially stop it, will kill the pa-
tient. It is only technological prowess (and maybe 
some hubris) that has led us to redefine "dying": 
nature will not presume to tell us who is dying; we 
will leave that to our technology. 
The importance of this mistake—letting technolo-gy redefine biological reality—is pertinent also 
for another problem in the responses to my article, 
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that bearing on "uncertainty." Whitbeck, I think, 
falls perfectly into a familiar technological trap, 
arguing that because a worse death might not be pre-
dictable, a doctor is justified in going ahead with 
treatment. The difficulty here is that contemporary 
medical technologies are usually powerful enough 
to bring uncertainty to almost any medical decision. 
We might be able to say, in a general way, that a 
patient is dying, but it gets harder and harder to say 
that a given technological intervention will not buy 
us a little more time. It probably will, which is why 
it is common to observe that most patients now die as 
the result of a conscious decision to stop or not to 
start treatment; it can hardly be otherwise given the 
power of technology to extend almost any life to 
some extent. The result too often here is that uncer-
tainty is dealt with by a technological bias: don't stop 
aggressive treatment until there is some definitive ev-
idence it will do no further good. Technological 
progress renders such evidence increasingly elusive. 
Now it is exactly that problem that sets us up for 
the suspicion that Meilaender has about the current 
practice of omission of treatment. "We may already," 
he writes, "be deliberately letting die people who 
aren't really dying." That may indeed be the case 
(even though I know of no direct evidence to support 
such a trend), but there may be a harder judgment to 
be made here than he allows. If we come to define as 
"not dying" a person whose process of dying technol-
ogy can suspend for a time (redefining him as just 
disabled), then of course every time a physician 
allows a patient who might be given a few more 
hours or days to die, he will be open to the charge 
that he is just part of the "transitional stage" to eu-
thanasia. That would not seem to me a fair or reason-
able judgment. 
Nor do I think it fair or reasonable to interpret 
what doctors customarily do when they terminate 
treatment of a patient whom their technology might 
continue to sustain as displaying an "intent . . . to 
bring about death" (which is, incidentally, what 
many euthanasia supporters also say). If a doctor 
wants a patient to die and terminates treatment with 
that as the specific purpose of the termination, that is 
wrong. But if, instead, a physician believes that the 
patient as a person no longer benefits from his efforts 
to suspend or arrest the dying process—either be-
cause of the burden of treatment or the burden of 
life—and then stands aside to allow death to take its 
inevitable course, no wrong has been committed. 
The intention is not to bring about death, but to 
allow the death that nature has built into our lives to 
take place. This is very different from saying that 
some "lives aren't worth preserving" (Meilaender) or 
that "their lives are of no benefit to them" (May). I do 
not hear doctors saying that, nor should they. 
In this respect, however, it strikes me as neither clear nor helpful to draw a sharp distinction be-
tween a burden of treatment and a burden of life. A 
painless, superficially non-burdensome, treatment 
that allows a painful or unwanted medical condition 
to continue should be as much feared as a painful 
treatment; who knows, or could ever know, whether 
Meilaender's demented seventy-seven-year-old pulls 
at his feeding tube because the tube causes him dis-
comfort or because the kind of life the tube is sustain-
ing is not one he wants to live? Would Meilaender tie 
down his hands (a not uncommon practice) if he sus-
pected the latter alone was the man's motive? I doubt 
it. But I say it does not matter anyway: whatever his 
reasons, the patient does not want the tube, and that 
should be respected. 
Medicine becomes increasingly clever in devising 
non-burdensome technologies to prolong miserable 
lives that a kinder nature would have allowed to end 
more peaceably in an earlier era. That is exactly the 
kind of medical "progress" we should question, just 
as we should have questioned in the 1970s whether we 
really wanted to go down the road of improved ways 
of extending the life expectancy of those in a PVS 
state. 
Smith is worried that "the list of patients deserving 
human care is shorter today." Maybe he lives around 
a different group of doctors and families and ethicists 
from those I do, but I know of no one who says that 
people should not have "human care," if by that is 
meant comfort, palliation, and non-abandonment. 
The only "shorter list" I see operating is one bearing 
on the use of medical technology, and a good thing 
that is. 
As far as I can guess, just about everything that 
would be on Smith's longer list would be some tech-
nology that came into widespread use only within 
the past two to three decades. Those decades were a 
period of enormous technological development and 
aggressive, usually compulsive, application. Thus at 
first it was thought imperative always to keep respi-
rators going, then to keep all technologies going at 
top speed in NICUS, and then to keep artificial nu-
trition and hydration going. The technological im-
perative was in the saddle, and to doubt its value was 
to be judged guilty of lacking both the secular virtue 
of loving progress and the religious value of the sanc-
tity of life. That's what created Smith's longer list— 
but it was the creature of a particular, and limited, 
historical era. The error is to take the practices of 
that era as some timeless norm of respect for human 
life. It was more likely a bemusement with technolo-
gy that was calling the moral shots. 
We seem to have come out of that compulsive era, gradually returning to standards of an earlier 
time, when it was not always thought a terrible thing 
that nature brought life to an end, especially when it 
spared a person further suffering or a humanly 
empty prolongation of life. I can recall many reli-
gious people in that pretechnological era speaking 
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of some deaths as a "blessing," even thanking God for 
bringing the suffering to an end. Was that wrong on 
their part? Should they instead now be thankful that 
the PVS loved one can be kept alive for years, and be 
full of pity for those earlier generations who were un­
aware of the benefits that medical technology could 
bring them? I'll take the shorter list myself, and I 
think the tradition would support my doing so. 
To accept the shorter list does not, however, entail 
an embrace of euthanasia or physician-assisted sui­
cide. There is a great gap between omitting treat­
ment and direcdy killing. When we omit a treatment, 
we are doing what medicine has always done, and has 
always had to do. We do not by such actions change 
the historical institution of medicine. There is, to be 
sure, always the danger that we may omit treatment 
too early, or deliberately and wrongly aim to end a life 
by doing so. But that hazard has always been present, 
and the tradition has lavished great attention on 
where and how to draw the appropriate lines and 
proceed with the right intentions. Euthanasia utterly 
changes all that: it is we, not nature, who kill; and 
medicine becomes an institution that legitimates the 
taking as well as the saving of life. 
A word on the "potential for development" notion, 
which so concerns Smith. I take it that we distinguish 
human beings from other species because of a char­
acteristic range of capacities and potentialities that 
only humans possess. These include self-conscious­
ness and the capacity for a wide range of emotions, 
reasoning skills, and interpersonal relationships. I 
simply fail to see what benefit any form of treatment 
can have for a person who has lost those capacities. 
The quadriplegic has those capacities and so do most 
of the severely demented, even if the latters' capaci­
ties are much diminished (and despite Meilaender's 
guess, I favor more treatment of the demented than 
he has guessed). The PVS patient is utterly different. 
By virtue of the loss of the cerebral cortex, the human 
capacities of PVS victims are permanently lost. It is 
hardly surprising that, before we invented effective 
tubes to nourish such beings, nature let them die 
quickly. It knew what it was doing. Θ 
April 
One day without warning Spring arrives, 
As predictable and unexpected as a death. 
Birdsong and the smack of dripping water, car tires 
Spitting on wet pavement sound strange and loud 
In the soft air. 
I am as empty as the trees and snowless land, 
Stripped of winter's enfolding wrap. 
Now robins tug at swollen worms, 
Raw green shoots split the earth. 
Nature has her way. 
In December the ground was frozen 
Hard as a bone. It took a backhoe to dig the hole. 
As long as I left traces in the snow 
You still were here. 
What's dead is dead and I can live with that; 
This rebirth's an intolerable affront. 
Suzanne Jane 
^ s 
Copyright and Use: 
As an ATLAS user, you may print, download, or send articles for individual use 
according to fair use as defined by U.S. and international copyright law and as 
otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement. 
No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the 
copyright holder(s)' express written permission. Any use, decompiling, 
reproduction, or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a 
violation of copyright law. 
This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permission 
from the copyright holder(s). The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal 
typically is the journal owner, who also may own the copyright in each article. However, 
for certain articles, the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the article. 
Please contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific 
work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered 
by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement. For information regarding the 
copyright holder(s), please refer to the copyright information in the journal, if available, 
or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s). 
About ATLAS: 
The ATLA Serials (ATLAS®) collection contains electronic versions of previously 
published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission. The ATLAS 
collection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association 
(ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc. 
The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the American 
Theological Library Association. 
